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SPEECH AS CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE
IN NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CASES
By REYN ODS C. SEiTz*
Significant since the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act' has been the problem of striking a balance between
the right of employees to be free from employer interference 2
and the right of the employer to freedom of speech.
As is always true in connection with a problem of balancing
rights and duties, difficulty is seldom encountered in connection
with extreme situations. Recognized frankly as fundamental m
the adjustment of competing liberties of employer and employee
is the axiom that the doctrine of freedom of speech does not
sanction any and all kinds of utterances. There has been a
full awareness that certain types of speech can always be prohibited because of the conviction that the social good that could
come from allowing their free expression is so slight as never
to outweigh the advantage of banning them.3 Patently coercive
statements, such as one which contains a threat to move the plant
if the employees unionize, 4 one which contains threats of dis* A. B., 1929, Notre Dame Umversity; A. M., 1932, Northwestern
University; LL. B., 1935, The Creighton University; Professor of Law,
The Creighton University, 1938-41; Senior Attorney, Review Division,
National Labor Relations Board, 1941-42; Professor of Business Law,
The Municipal University of Omaha; frequent contributor to legal
periodicals; admitted to practice in Nebraska in 1935.
'49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 151 (Supp. 1940).
'Sec. 8 (1) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "
.interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees m the exercise of their right.
(to selforganization)"
3 Chaplinsky v State of New Hampshire, 62 Sup. Ct. 766, 769
(1942) Miller's, Inc. v. Tailors Union, 15 A. (2d) 824 (N. J.
),
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1940) 150; Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and In3uries to Personality (1916) 26
Harv. L. Rev. 640.
IN. L. R. B. v. Asheville Hoisery Co., 108 F (2d) 288 (C. C. A.
4th 1939), Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 106 F (2d) 254 (C. C. A. 3rd 1939),
cert. den. 308 U. S. 615 (1938), Stockpole Carbon Co., 6 N. L. R. B.
171 (1938), Matter of Titan Metal Manufacturing Co. and Federal
Labor Union No. 19981, 5 N. L. R. B. 577; Matter of Leo L. Lowry and
International Association of Machinists, 3 N. L. R. B. 626; Matter of
Remington Rand, Inc., and Remington Rand Joint Protective Board
of the District Council Office Equipment Workers, 2 N. L. R. B. 626.
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charge or other discrimnnation,5 or of bodily harm, are easy to
label unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act. Also logically falling within the category
of unfair labor practices are employer expressions which have
occurred against a background of open manifestations of hostility
8
to self-organization.7 As suggested by one writer, it is not
difficult to find coercion as a "fact" when employer expressions
occur against a background of "discharge of union sympathizers,
physical violence in stifling organization efforts, and/or the
slowing down of production."
When, however, employer utterances are of a type different
than described in the preceding paragraph, much greater precision in thinking is needed to work out an equitable adjustment of the question as to whether or not employer statements
are coercive so as to amount to interference within Section 8
(1) of the National Labor Relations Act.
Such a realization has prompted this discussion. It is
hoped that some concepts may be set forth which may help to
clarify thinking when problems arise which demand a delicate
adjustment of employer and employee relationship within the
area already described.
The philosphy which motivates Board decisions within the
field covered by this article is persuasively set forth in one of
the Ford cases. 9 The Board states. "Whether the words or
actions of an employer constitute interference, restraint, or

'N. L. R. B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49, rev'g. Matter
of Fruehauf Trailer Co. and United Automobile Workers Federal
Labor Union, 1 N. L. R. B. 68; Nebel Knitting Co. and American
Federation of Hosiery Workers, 6 N. L. R. B. 284.
1Cf. Republic Steel Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 107 F (2d) 472
(C. C. A. 3rd 1939).
1 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197 (1938)
where the Supreme Court assumed that employer expressions of
opinion were unfair labor practices where there was "substantial
evidence" that "attempts at intimidation or coercion" were made.
Also see Report of the N. L. R. B. to the Senate Committee, p. 60
(1939), which presents the position of the Board on the matter of
expression of opinion when coupled with open manifestations of
self-organization. See, too, Matter of Sinclair Refining Co. and W B.
McKay, 20 N. L. R. B. No. 75, where the Board stressed that it considers "the entire factual background" in determining whether to
sustain or dismiss a complaint alleging that an employer made coercive
statements.
8
Note (1941) 8 U. of Cbi. L. Rev. 350.
*Matter of Ford Motor Company (St. Louis, Mo.), 23 N. L. R. B.
No. 28.
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coercion, within the meaning of the act, must be judged, not as
an abstract proposition, but in the light of the economic realities
of the employer-employee relationship. It need hardly be
stressed that the dominant position of an employer, who exercises
the power of economic life and death over his employees, gives to
the employer's statements, whether or not ostensibly couched
as argument or advice, an immediate and compelling effect that
they would not possess if addressed to economic equals." 10
The Board's adherence to such a viewpoint has resulted in
more than one finding of coercion as the outgrowth of employer
statements of opinion on union matters in the absence of express
threats and intimidation.1 1 In a considerable number of other
cases the Board has found employer expressions of opinion or
advice to constitute interference within the meaning of the
National Labor Relations Act even though other illegal acts were
trivial. 12 The Board's position has indeed been such as to
prompt one writer, Killingsworth, to remark that, "The Board
with an attitude of, 'Can
appears to approach decision
this somehow be construed as a violation of the law' Is there
a scintilla of coercion in such a statement V "13
Indeed Killingsworth's query appropriately serves as an
introduction to references to the opposition that has developed
in respect to the Board's finding of coercion in the absence of a
"background of hostility " The Board's position has not al-

0An attorney for the Board has stated the position in more blunt
terms. See, ROSENFAR, THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND How IT
WORKs, 79-80 (1940). There it is said: 'Treedom of speech is possible
only among those who approximate each other in equality of position.
When an employer addresses himself to his employees on the subject
of unionism, orally or in writing, directly or through some mouthpiece, economic compulsion comes in through the door and freedom
of speech flies out the window" Board member W M. Leiserson
stated, while he was chairman of the National Mediation Board, that
unions under the Railway Labor Act have always insisted that employers' opinions on the matter of unionism interfere with employees'
freedom of organization; the unions say that such expressions of
opinion are always coercive and mtinidating, National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments: Hearzngs Before the Committee
on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 76th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1939), pt. 6, p. 992.
" See, Killingsworth, Employer Freedom of Speech and the N. L.
R. B. (1941) Wis. L. R. 217-220, for an analysis of the factual background and the citation of cases.
"Note 11, supra.
INote 11, supra, at p.- 237.
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A University
ways met with the approval of Circuit Courts.'
15
of Chicago Law Review note focuseg attention upon the proposition that once the court has enjoined the employer's unfair
labor practices, there may be a broad area within which the
employer can speak without reasonable employees feeling that
they are coerced. Killingsworth' 6 wonders if the Board's condemnation of marginal statements of employers may not point
out implied threats which the average employee would never
discover for himself. Van Dusen 1 7 very persuasively argues
that "since the National Labor Relations Act amply protects
employees against discrimination, freedom of expression by employers, when unaccompanied by threats to violate the act, and
not consisting of purely defamatory statements, can safely be
permitted to stand" because "it constitutes 'no clear and present danger ' 8 to the institution of collective bargaining, except
The
insofar as it is able to convince rather than coerce."
National Association of Manufacturers more pointedly asks, 1 9
"Did Congress intend that the Board should prevent employers
from expressing their opinion or stating truthfully the facts
about umomsm2" The Chamber of Commerce of the United
States has uttered statements of the same nature. 20 Actually,
almost every employer who appeared before the Congressional
committees considering amendments to the National Labor Relations Act has offered some criticism along the same general
line.2 1 Even the American Federation of Labor 22 has not been
satisfied with the interpretation of the right to free speech which
the Board sometimes makes.

"See, Van Dusen, Freedom of Speech and The National Labor
Relations Act (1941) 35 IM. L. R. 417-22 for discussion and citation
of cases.
58 Urn. of Cli. L. Rev. 350 (1941).
"Note 11, supra at 238.
27Note 14, supra at 423.
Criterion adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court to determine
whether a limitation upon freedom of speech is justified: Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U. S. 652,671 (1925), Schenck v. United States, 249
U. S. 47, 51 (1919).
" National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments:
Heanngs Before the Committee on Education and Labor, United
States Senate, 76 Cong. 1st Sess. (1939), pt. 11, p. 2032.
"The Chamber's Pamphlet, Amendment of the National Labor
Relations Act (1939), p. 9.
'Note 11, supra, citing examples at p. 212.
" American Federation of Labor, Explanatory Comment on
Amertcan Federation of Labor Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act (1939), pp. 9-10.
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A close analysis of the opposing points of view in regard to
the speech issue under the National Labor Relations Act reveal,
as is so often the situation, that there is logic in the reasoning of
both the employer interests and the union interests. It is the
thesis of this article that confusion exists because decision has
been based upon a wrong premise. More specifically, it is submitted that the test on the speech issue under the National Labor
Relations Act should be on the foundation of conditional privilege rather than on the basis of the "fact" of coercion as it is
developed out of evidence which appears in each individual
case. To base holdings upon the finding of coercion as a "fact"
sidesteps the appeal in the argument that the presence of the
National Labor Relations Board and its vigorous enforcement
policy should make employees feel so secure against discrimination that it should be found that speech separated from threats
and a background of hostility does not coerce. 2 3 It would appear much less difficult to hold that employer speech on union
matters, even though separated from threats and a background
of hostility, constituted an "interference" with employees in
the "exercise of their right to self-organization" 24 In
all instances when the employer was not conditionally privileged
to express himself.
Upon reflection such reasoning is not specious. Although
employer statements might very well not coerce employees, they
could interfere with the exercise of the employees' right to selforganization by creating such doubts as to influence them to
take action which th~ey otherwise would not have taken. Since
much speech tends to convince, it is not unrealistic to adopt the
principle that the policy of the National Labor Relations Act
treats employer speech on union topics as interference unless it
is conditionally privileged.
Such an approach could very well impress both the employer and the employee with its common sense reasonableness.
The employer so often professes to feel aggrieved because the
Board brands him as practicing coercion when he feels that he
has merely reacted as a reasonable man, and when he knows that
he had no intent to coerce. He feels strongly that b]e should
be judged on the basis of his reactions as a reasonable
I Note 14, supra at 423 and note 15, supra.
' Section 8 (1) of the National Labor Relations Act.
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prudent man, and his irritation is not allayed by the fact
that on the ground of statistics, in most cases in which employer
speech is an issue, the Board has correctly found a background
of hostility The employer takes the position that he resents
being castigated because he follows his human nature and reacts
as the reasonable man. By deciding the speech issue on the basis
of conditional privilege the Board would be able to take cogmzance of this attitude of the employer. So, too, ought the union to
feel satisfied that fair recognition had been given its position on
the speech issue if the Board were to adopt the principle that
when the employer speaks to his employees on union matters he
"interferes with
the exercise of their right to self-organization unless he is conditionally privileged to so speak."
The submission of some factual suppositions will disclose
just how placing decisions on the speech issue upon a foundation
of conditional privilege can result in reasonable distinctions, and
can permit of more consistency of decision. Suppose that a
union threatens workers with physical violence or economic
reprisal in an effort to influence the workers' selection of
representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining. The employer feels that it is reasonable for him to respond by addressmg is employees in criticism of such tactics. It would appear
just for the Board to find that under the circumstances the
employer was conditionally privileged to speak.2 5 Suppose an
employer told his workers that he thought they did not need a
union to protect their interests, but they could have one if they
wished. It would seem that no fundamental concept of right
would be violated if the Board found the employer's speech an
unfair labor practice 2 6 on the ground of interference. Suppose
a union has embarked upon a course of violence and destruction, carried on for the purpose of coercing an employer to help
herd its employees into the union. Certainly, the employer
should be conditionally privileged to express himself in opposition to such practices. Mr. Justice Jackson's language for the
' See, Cooper, What Changes In FederalLegislationand Administration Are Desirable In the Field of Labor Relations Law, prize
wnmg
Ross Essay (1942) 28 A. B. A. J. 1385; reprinted 6 Urn. of
Detroit Law J. 13 (1942), for the suggestion that such union action
should be treated as an unfair labor practice and the privilege of

the National Labor Relations Act denied to the union.
Compare the situation, In re Crawford Mfg. Co., 8 N. L. R. B.
1237 (1938).
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majority in the recently decided case, National Labor Relatwns
27
would Imply such.
Board v Indiana and Michugan Electric C0.
a result. Suppose an employer propounds a number of questions, either oral or written, in regard to the Labor Act and gives
correct answers thereto, but only such answers as related to what
the employees were required to do under the Labor Act. It is
understandable that the Board condemned as unfair the onesided employer expression which said nothing about employee
rights. 28 Suppose an employer expresses himself as opposed to
dealing with union representatives who are known gangsters
or thugs. Does not fairness dictate excusing the employer on
the ground of conditional privilege?
On the assumption that there is nothing in the National
Labor Relations Act which would prevent the suggested acceptance of such an interpretation of the Act, it becomes necessary
to analyze criteria for determining whether speech is conditionally privileged. Since the concept of- conditional privilege
has been developed against the background of defamation, it
will serve in a search for facts to survey that area of the law.
Fundamentally, as we have already implied, and as Professor
Hallem has pointed out in connection with his discussion on
defamation, 2 9 the test should be whether the communication is
reasonable under the circumstances. Or as Professor Hallem has
put it in another one of his articles,3 0 the criteria should be
whether the utterer has acted as a reasonable man under the
circumstances. More exact guides to decision have been furnished by the authors of the Restatement of Torts in their discussion of conditional privilege in defamation.
The Restatement presents several criteria for the deteruination of the existence of conditional privilege. Section
59431 states that "an occasion is conditionally privileged where
circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that (a)
facts exist which affect a sufficiently important interest of the
63 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394 (1943). The issue was not one of free
speech, but the language seems broad enough to cover such issue.
I See, Matter of Mock-Judson-Voehrmger Co. of N. C. Inc., 8
N. L. R. B. 133 (1938), In the Matter of Mansfield Mills, 3 N. L. R. B.
901 (1937).
Excessve Publicationin Defamation (1932) 16 Minn. L. R. 160.
Characterof Belief Necessary for the Conditional Privilege zn
Defamation (1931) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 865.
'RESTATEMENT

or TORTS (1938).
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publisher, and (b) the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory
matter will be of service in the lawful protection of the interest."
Section 59532 sets forth that "an occasion is conditionally
privileged when the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that (a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently
important interest of the recipient or a third person, and (b)
the recipient is one to whom the publisher is under a legal duty
to publish the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its
publication is otherwise within the generally accepted standards
of decent conduct." A perusal of the quoted passages suggests
that, by substituting the phrase "the employer's attitude toward
the union" for the phrase "defamatory matter" and the word
"employer" for "publisher", the language can serve as a definite
guide and justification for deciding speech issues under Section
8 (1) of the National Labor Relations Act.
It would not appear to need exhaustive or elaborate argument to logically establish that union conduct may be such that
the employer's interest of legitimate self-protection may justify
communication to that group-bis employees-who seem to be
in the best position to look after interests which are jeopardized
by unfair union practices. Similarly, if we adopt the philosophy
that capital and labor should cooperate for one common end, it
would seem that improper union activity would justify employer
speech in criticism. Such justification would seem to rest upon
the reasonable assumption that such a relationship exists
between the employer and his employees as to sanction employer
intervention on the ground of safeguarding the interests of
employees.
To make the suggested approach wholly realistic and workable, it becomes necessary to take cognizance of certain facts.
Since in essence the viewpoint in this discussion has stressed
fair play between capital and labor, it would not do to permit
conditional privilege to excuse the speech of an employer who
was guilty of prior or contemporaneous unfair labor practices or
conduct. So too it becomes imperative that recognition be given
the fact that an employer may go so far in his speech as to defeat
his conditional privilege on the commonly accepted theory of
excessive publication. As indicated earlier in this article, the
fundamental test isalways the reasonableness of the employer's
2RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

(1938).
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conduct under the circumstances. Some may object to such a
test as too illusive. The courts, however, have found it workable
in other areas of law. In addition, it' would appear no more
difficult of application than the determination of coercion as a
"fact"
In final analysis the intent of this treatise has been to place
decision on the speech issue in National Labor Relations Board
cases on a foundation wh;eh presupposes the theory that capital
and labor should cooperate with each other for their common
good. It would appear that an administrative board should do all
possible to take a one-sided emphasis off "rights" and should
place a fair emphasis upon "duties"
The National Labor
Relations Board should continue to be intolerant about malicious
propaganda, but it must be careful not to infringe upon the
inalienable right of a man to respond as a reasonable human
being in the protection of his own interests, or in the protection
of the interests of those who are closely associated with him as
his employees.

